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Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are
Frame-breaking Changes Still Possible
Through Application of Intractable
Conflict Intervention Approaches to This

"Hurting Stalemate"?
A. MARCO TURK*

I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article for this law review' I argued that the
struggle for peaceful reunification in Cyprus must be reconfigured
in order to "consider the needs of abused people, their hatred over
human rights abuses, ethnic divisions, and exclusion from
democratic processes in the determination of their own destinies. '
A major impediment to achieving this outcome is that "past
history of the conflict is a weight that bears heavily on those who
sit at the negotiating table."4 My suggested antidote was the
utilization of the Track III or "community-based" approach to
diplomacy, utilizing Braithwaite's theory of "democratized

J.D. cum laude (Southwestern University School of Law), B.A. (University of
Washington). Professor of Negotiation, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding (NCRP)
and Director of NCRP Graduate and Undergraduate programs, California State
University, Dominguez Hills. Adjunct (Loyola Law School Los Angeles) in International
Conflict Resolution. Since my 1997-1999 Fulbright Senior Scholar award in conflict
resolution, my international peacebuilding efforts have been centered on Cyprus where I
have made four return trips (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005) in addition to work in the USA.
1. See A. Marco Turk, Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for
Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic
Conflict, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205 (2006).
2. See id. at 205-06.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 218.
5. Id. at 221-222.
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restorative justice, 6 to encourage disputants to (1) "come to terms
with their anger and hatred of past crimes of war," (2) practice
"rituals to heal damaged souls," (3) "transform hatred into sorrow
or forgiveness," and (4) "exorcise the evil of the past while moving
forward with hope."7 The result is a "bottom up" rather than a
"top-down" process 8 that is preferable to traditional "elite
diplomacy" which fails to consider "reactions of the general
population.'
I advocated the use of connecting and communicating skills
by members of the Cypriot civil society:" (1) empowerment to
exchange stories, (2) respectful reception by the listener, (3)
humanizing rather than demonizing each other, (4) appreciating
fully each others' interests and underlying needs, (5)
understanding that respect for an opposing point of view does not
equate with agreement, and (6) self-respect. The result is the
"Seven Keys to Peacebuilding": (a) empowerment to participate,
(b) recognition of opposing points of view, (c) trust to disclose the
past, (d) truth expressed without reservation, (e) forgiveness
without forgetting, (f) collaboration to produce solutions, and (g)
reconciliation for future peace."
As of the date of final submission of my earlier article, the
virtual stalemate between the opposing elements of traditional
elite diplomacy regarding reunification continued to exist.'2
II.

CURRENT STATUS OF CONFLICT AND ITS FUTURE

A. Background of the Problem
By the time this article is published more than three years will
have passed since the bicommunal referenda voting on April 24,
2004. Notwithstanding the feeling of some in both communities
that 2007 will be the year in which a solution to the Cyprus
problem will finally emerge, there is currently an ongoing impasse.

6. See

JOHN

BRAITHWAITE,

REGULATION 172, 194, 207 (2002).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See Turk, supra note 1, at 250.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 251-252.
Id.
See id. at 254-55.

RESTORATIVE

JUSTICE

AND

RESPONSIVE
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Without significant change, the result will be this impasse, and not
a resolution acceptable to both communities.
Ironically, the "long advocated reunification of the divided
island on a bicommunal and bizonal basis" by Greek Cypriots was
in the end rejected by their negative referendum vote in April
2004. The reversal of historical roles between Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots was complete when the normally secessionminded Turkish Cypriots voted for reunification." Efforts for a
negotiated settlement appear to have disappeared. These have
been replaced by unilateral attempts to keep alive the pro-solution
enthusiasm of the Turkish Cypriots while trying to motivate Greek
Cypriots to effect political change. Surrounding this seems to be a
cadre of support for "inter-communal reconciliation.' ' 4 "[P]ressure

upon the political elites of both communities for immediate
recommencement of negotiations" and reduction of "the isolation
of the north" (as the "key to promoting a long-term and
sustainable solution based on equality") have been advocated."
Reunification "within the broad framework laid down in the
Annan Plan" appears to be "the only proposal that seems
ultimately capable of common acceptance."' 6 Incredibly, the initial
idea for a bizonal and bicommunal federation is attributed to the
1970s collaboration between Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios
and the Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktash.'7 Present blockage of a
similar agreement appears to be "the policy and attitude of the
Greek Cypriot leadership and in particular of President Tassos
Papadopoulos."'' But
[the Greek Cypriot Leadership] should realise that if they
persist in their refusal to engage with the United Nations and
with Cyprus's other international partners, the island will slip by
default toward permanent partition and the independence of
the north, whether formally recognised or not. The idea that
Turkish Cypriots will instead accept minority
status in a
9
centralised Greek Cypriot state is a pipe dream.'

13.

See Int'l Crisis Group, The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?, Mar. 8, 2006,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4003&1=1.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17.

See id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
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Clearly, the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict need to be
changed if there is to be hope for success concerning any future
UN-brokered solution that might be proposed. This would require
a new environment that advances the best interests of all parties.0
B. Specific Issues to Be Considered
1. European Union
The EU must promote "the economic development and
of northern Cyprus as it pledged to do in
European integration
'
April 2004. 21

2. Greek Cypriots
In order to rise above the "uncompromising position taken by
government, ' '22 opposition forces, moderates from all
present
the
political elements, and leaders of civil society must generate debate
of the critical "core issues., 23 They must understand that regional
stability will result from the two-state model and accept that the
1963 actions of the Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots are as
responsible for the conflict as the 1974 actions of Turkey against
the Greek Cypriots. They must also acknowledge that upheaval
from their homes and mourning their missing apply equally to
Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots, and reconsider the
advantages of implementing the bizonal and bicommunal
principles to which Greek Cypriots agreed more than thirty years
ago.

24

3. Greece
The Greek government needs to actively affirm to the
international community its support of the Annan Plan to restart
negotiations and seek a solution satisfactory to both sides.' In
addition, Greece should assume the lead role in seeing that the EU
renews efforts to discharge its obligations to Turkish Cypriot
21
citizens.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

;Cf id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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4. Turkish Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots must deal with the numerous unresolved
property cases, bring their laws and practices into compliance with
the acquis communautaire of the EU,27 see to it that the EUTurkey Customs Union is extended to the north, and obtain
agreement from Turkey to reduce (a) its number of military forces
on the island and (b) its population of mainland settlers resulting
from a thirty-year migration to the northern part of the island.28
They should also demonstrate more understanding of Greek
Cypriot demands concerning their missing and the need for
of cultural monuments damaged over the years since
restoration
29
1974.
5. Turkey
Unilateral confidence-building efforts need to be undertaken
to demonstrate its support of a satisfactory settlement." Full
implementation of the twenty-five member-state Customs Union
and Turkey's other existing EU commitments should be pursued.'
There should be partial reduction of the thirty-five thousand
troops that are stationed in the north to a number that would not
threaten the security interest of Turkey,32 and a plan for
repatriation of a specified number of mainland Turkish settlers
based on a formal census should be pursued."
6. United States
The U.S. can facilitate efforts to restart settlement
negotiations for reunification of Cyprus within the broad
framework of the Annan Plan by upgrading its diplomatic
presence on the northern part of the island, and (b) increasing its
contacts at every level with Turkish Cypriot officials and civil
society.'

27. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 13.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cf id.
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7. United Nations
This world organization must call for an end to the "isolation
of northern Cyprus" and encourage the Greek Cypriots to
"indicate their concerns with the Annan Plan in a form which
offers some hope for a negotiated settlement."" At the same time,
the UN must create a United Nations Development Programme
Trust Fund for the north.36
C. Current Dilemmas FacingReunification
Nicos A. Rolandis 7 has been the standard bearer for those
Greek Cypriots who support reunification. He writes regularly on
the subject and constantly reminds his fellow citizens that their
country "is continuously going down a slippery slope." In arguing
that "the situation on the ground has deteriorated," Rolandis
conducted a review of the "political due diligence of the past 32
months. ' 9 He concluded that the Greek Cypriots, by their actions:
* have "solidified the concept of partition"; '
* have lost the beautiful seaport city of Famagusta (to
which "her residents would have returned two and a
half years ago" if the plan had been accepted)";
* have lost the historically important village of
Morphou;'2
• have missed the opportunity to have 90,000 refugees
returned to "fifty-odd villages" representing "9% of
the territory which would have4 3 been returned" to
Greek Cypriots in the settlement;
* have lost the opportunity to achieve "termination of
the Turkish occupation through the withdrawal of

35. Id.
36. Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 13.
37. Republic of Cyprus Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1983), Minister of
Commerce, Industry & Tourism (1998-2003), member of House of Representatives (19911996), President of the Liberal Party (1986-1998), and Vice-president of Liberal
International.
38. See Nicos A. Rolandis, Cyprus: Political Due Diligence 2004-2006; The Gods and
Friedrich Schiller 1 (Dec. 28, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rolandis, Political
Due Diligence 2004-20061.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Id.
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more than 39,000 troops, return of the refugees,
restoration of human rights";"
have contributed to diminished confidence between
the two communities, 4
have been "inundated with a large number
of
6
additional Turkish settlers" who may not leave;
have permitted construction of new buildings in the
"occupied areas" (mainly for foreign buyers) worth
47
"hundreds of millions of pounds";
have allowed "an explosion of tourist development in
incessantly," and that will
the north, which continues
8
not "come back to us;4
have enabled "the EU through its European Court of
Human Rights ... indirect recognition of the Turkish
Cypriot "state";4
have permitted establishment of a "contact group
between the European Parliament and the Turkish
Cypriot 'state'"..;
have facilitated acceptance of "members of the
Turkish Cypriot 'Parliament' as observers in the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe"; 51
have created a situation where for "the first time since
1960... the Cypriot President has not been invited for
a meeting with the leadership of the U.S."; but the
Turkish Cypriot leader was included in a meeting with
the U.S. secretary of state "in Brussels, in London, in
Pakistan and elsewhere";2
have created a situation where for "the first time in
history" the Secretary-General and other high officials
of the U.N. "are negative or even hostile vis-A-vis [the
government of the Republic of Cyprus]"; 3

44. Id. (quoting an evaluation made in April 2004 by AKEL, the "big party of the
governing coalition").
45.

Id.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
48.

Id.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

53.

Id.

470

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 29:463

• have created a situation where the "55-odd countries"
of the Islamic Conference have "for the first time
upgraded the Turkish Cypriots to the status of
'Turkish Cypriot state'";-4
* have created a situation where the European
Commission "is not friendly at all towards" the
Republic of Cyprus;
* have enabled Turkey's commendation in 2004 by the
European Council (which includes the Republic of
Cyprus) for "her constructive stance on Cyprus";56
* have allowed "the operation of the Tymbou (Ercan)
Airport" to be "considered as lawful for Cypriot,
European and other foreign passengers" since 2004;"7
• have created a scenario where "partition is in the
wings" as "direct trade"; 8
* have created a situation where the Republic of Cyprus
"went through the humiliation of December 2006 in
Brussels" when the republic demonstrated that it did
not "possess even some ,vestiges of knowhow,
experience and realism"; 9 and
* have created a situation where "for the first time, the
Cyprus problem is completely stagnant, nothing
moves,
whilst partition is gradually but steadily setting
0
"1
.
in
According to Rolandis, this is notwithstanding that he and
others "have been speaking the bitter truth for 30 years and
abandoned positions and high offices., 6' He asks the hard
questions:
Has this been appreciated or have we been berated for our
stance? Have we managed to change the mentality of this
54.

Id.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id. Presumably, a reference to "Ankara (Turkey) accuses Nicosia (Cyprus) of
using its membership to snag Turkey's accession bid and extract concessions in the Cyprus
dispute. Cyprus, which like all EU members wields veto powers, swiftly rejected Turkey's
new initiative as a 'mockery'." See E. U.Wrangles over Turkish Initiative, FRANCE 24, Dec.
8,
2006,
http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/news/Europe/20061206-CyprusReax.html.
60. Rolandis, Political Due Diligence 2004-2006, supra note 38, at 4.
61. Id.
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people who live with one hand lying on their wallet and the
other hand on 'power' and 'favoritism', instead of placing one
hand on their heart and the other on their country?
Rolandis has also considered what will happen when the
Greek Cypriot presidential election takes place in 2008.63 He has a
number of suggestions for the new president:
* Serve only a brief term concentrating on the resolution
of the Cyprus problem, with the knowledge that this
"will entail difficult and probably tragic moments for
himself."'
* Understand that he "will have to give the correct
guidelines to the people, so that the blunders of the
past will not be repeated," knowing that "many
political parties will not be helpful in his quest for a
solution."' 65
* Be "prudent and moderate," because "[n]ationalists
or
address bicommunal
and fanatics cannot
lead to
multicommunal issues" since "[t]hey
confrontation. '
* Accept that he "must be fair and objective" in
recognizing that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots are "debited with sins," and "he must be
prepared to pay the price for these sins of ours. 67
* "[K]now that a bicommunal, bizonal federation for
which we have signed both in the red ink of Makarios
and in the blue ink of other Presidents, entails a
number of substantive rights for the Turkish Cypriot
community, which should not and cannot be
overlooked. '
* "[U]pgrade radically our relations with Europe, where
we are , 69today conceived as the black sheep of the
family.

62. Id.
63. See Nicos A. Rolandis, Greek Hero Kolokotronis, The Gunshot and the New
President 2-5 (Jan. 18, 2007) (on file with author).
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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*

Reopen the "gates" of Washington, D.C., that have
been "firmly closed for the President of the Republic
of Cyprus for the past four years," and also "gain
better access to the family of the United Nations.""
This will require acknowledgement that "sovereignty
and state entity do not permanently belong to [the
Republic of Cyprus]" because they are subject to the
recognition of "the other 191 states of the world."7'
" "[K]eep the balances which are a prerequisite for the
survival of our country" by realizing, in part, that
"Cyprus does not appear on many.world maps, not
'
even as a small speck."72
* 'E]xtend a hand of friendship to the Turkish Cypriots
and to their leaders, even if such leaders will have to
reach an understanding with Ankara [Turkey] in
connection with the solution of our problem." 3
Otherwise, if "each side insists on its own positions to
the bitter end, if we continue pulling Cyprus until we
tear it apart, we shall eventually cry over a lost
country.",1

The former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has been
quoted as saying, "[w]hat is hurting is the interpretation put on our
'yes vote' by the Americans and others to the effect that the
Turkish Cypriot side has thus abandoned its sovereignty and
separate independence, which is not true."7 He feels that although
the EU seems interested in lifting the embargo against Turkish
Cypriots, the end result may not be certain if "the EU regards
North Cyprus as an occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus. As
long as they do not treat the North Cyprus on its own merits, all
such moves are done with the consent of and subject to the
conditions of the so-called government of Cyprus.""
Notwithstanding close monitoring of the Cyprus situation by the
EU, Denktash is of the opinion that "it would be catastrophic" for
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Gul Demir & Niki Gamm, Rauf Denktas: "Politics Was Not My Choice,"
TURKISH DAILY TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?
enewsid=65303.
76. Id.
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Turkey to withdraw its troops from the island.77 Denktash feels
that such action would cause Turkish Cypriots to have a "loss of
faith in Turkey, in the EU and in themselves. New bloodshed
would be followed by the Turkish Cypriots fleeing from the
island.""
There appears to be some movement toward a two-state
solution for Cyprus, at least from Turkish Cypriots, as indicated in
a recent poll of members of that community. Approval of a twostate solution was supported by sixty-five percent while only
twenty percent indicated a preference for a federal state.' This is
"a big swing of opinion since the 2004 referendum when sixty-five
percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan
plan."' Apparently, partition is also gathering support among
Greek Cypriots. "1 According to a 2006 opinion poll, 48% indicated
support for full community separation while only 45% still
supported reunification. 2 Of this comparison, the majority of
young Greek Cypriots (63% of ages eighteen to twenty-four, and
59% of ages twenty-five to thirty-four) indicated that they
preferred not to live with Turkish Cypriots.83 The irony is that the
common ground indicated by the interest in partition from both
communities is contrary to the efforts of the international
community to bring about reunification of the island, and
consistent with the quote attributed to Rauf Denktash: "You
cannot force two unwilling partners into marriage."'
Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos
has not decided whether he will run for re-election in 2008. "' Based

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Lale Sariibrahimoglu, Two-State Solution for Cyprus?, TODAY'S ZAMAN,
Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=101616; see
also Tragic Common Ground Between North and South, CYPRUS MAIL,
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=30470&cat-id=l (last visited Feb. 23,
2007).
80. See Tragic Common Ground Between North and South, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Cyprus President Against Casino, FIN. MIRROR, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://www.financialmirror.com/more-news.php?id=5854&type=news. "No man's land" is
the area of the buffer zone between the two communities patrolled by and under the
control of U.N. peacekeeping forces.
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on his actions so far regarding reunification, such a decision will
have an impact on the solution to the Cyprus problem:
" He proposed demilitarization of the walled capital city
of Nicosia (the last such divided capital city in the
world) so that a crossing point would be opened at the
end of one of the city's main commercial streets
(Ledra Street) in order to secure safe passage for
Cypriots crossing to and from the north through "no
man's land."'
* He hopes that "during 2007 there will be sufficient
preparation for substantive negotiations leading to a
Cyprus settlement."
* He acknowledged that "we know exactly what the
other side is aiming at, and they know exactly what we
are aiming at. [Turkish Cypriots] clearly want to
establish in Cyprus two separate legal entities, upgrade
their own entity to a state short of diplomatic
recognition ....

*
*
"
*
*
•

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

We want a solution that will lead to

the reunification of the state, the territory, society,
economy, [and] institutions."'
He believes any solution must serve "exclusively" the
interests of the Cypriot people.89
He is committed to a bizonal, bicommunal federal
solution.'
He believes that "people with good will can find a
solution without depriving either Greek Cypriots or
Turkish Cypriots of their rights."91
He feels that a reunified Cyprus is the "best thing" for
Cypriots.92
He stressed that the property issue is "crucial" to a
political settlement. 3
He feels that there is a better solution than the Annan
plan that was rejected by Greek Cypriots in 2004."'
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He is "genuinely" in favor of Turkey's European
orientation so long as it meets its obligations to the
EU and to Cyprus that are the same as required of
other candidates for EU membership.
He does "not want to isolate the Turkish Cypriots"
since "it is not in our interest because I think the
economic equilibrium is one of the basic necessities,
prerequisites for bringing about a solution." But he
insists that "the issue is not economic but political and
figures prove it.""
He continues to oppose opening of the airport in the
north to international '' flights
on the ground of
"sovereignty of the state. 17

On the other side, Mehmet Ali Talat, the current Turkish
Cypriot leader, has also commented on the Cypriot problem:
* He wants more notice from the world for Turkish
Cypriots and the lifting of the "unfair isolations"
because Turkish Cypriots by their referendum vote
"had proved their will for a solution in the island and
their intention could not be judged." 8
* He believes that with the assistance of Turkey, Turkish
Cypriots are "striving for" a fair and lasting
compromise in Cyprus.
• He noted the "extensive armament in the Greek
Cypriot part" and said that this was disconcerting."
* He stated Turkish Cypriots were equal partners with
Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 and
would be their "political equal" in any future
agreement. So they should "have equal right and say
on the natural resources on the land and sea areas of
the island of Cyprus." This came in response to the

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Talat: We Want the World to Take Notice of Turkish Cypriots More and Lift
the
Unfair
Isolations, ANATOLIAN
TIMES
(Turk.),
Jan.
23,
2007,
http://www.anatoliantimes.com/hbr2.asp?id=160277.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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recent argument over who owns the oil in Cyprus and
who should receive compensation for it."'
The United States has also indicated its thoughts on the
Cypriot problem:
" It hopes that "2007 could be a year of Cyprus. And
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is now putting
together a team. We hope that there will be even
senior Americans on that team in the new UN effort
to try to resolve finally the problems that have
stemmed from the invasion of Cyprus 30 years ago.''
" It is optimistic that 2007 will be the year for a final
Cyprus solution based on the "hope that all the
relevant parties can come together to once again try to
find a solution to this very difficult long-standing
problem."'03
* It feels that ultimately the Greek Cypriots decided
against the Annan plan."
* It believes that the region is at "a point now where
enough interested parties in the region have expressed
an interest in maybe trying again to find a solution......
* It supports renewed UN efforts to find a solution, but
the U.S. "would be in a supporting role.' '°
III. THE NEED TO ESTABLISH COOPERATIVE RELATIONS IN SPITE
OF THE INTRACTABLE CONFLICT RESULTING FROM THE EVENTS OF

1963 AND 1974
The 1960 Constitution was "an unusual experiment in
consociational democracy.' ' .7 Consociational democracy "is the
solution to the problem of coexistence inside one single people
between different tendencies (religious, social, etc.).""
101. See Talat Letter to Ban Ki-Moon: Turkish Cypriots Have Equal Right on Natural
Resources, CYPRUS OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 2007, http://www.observercyprus.com/
observer/NewsDetails.aspx?id=1 154.
102. See Sean McCormack, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Jan.
10, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/78512.htm).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Reed Coughlan, Cyprus: From Corporate Autonomy to the Search for Territorial
Federalism, in AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN

MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 219, 219 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000).
108. Id. at 224.
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"Consociationalism is also referred to as "sociological federalism"
or "personal federalism,"' which "could not have been expected
to succeed in Cyprus ... because of the very structure of Cypriot
society. ' .. A successful consociational democracy requires a
society composed of "three or more segments and where no single
segment is dominant."'' . Cyprus, however, is an ethnic conflict area
consisting of "two highly segmented elements"
that "are
2
demographically and economically unequal.,1
After 1974, when the military intervention by Turkey
effectively partitioned Cyprus, the possibility of "a territorially
based federation" presented itself through the physical separation
resulting from the exchange of populations on the island."3 It has
been argued that federalism "is not an appropriate solution for
Cyprus ... because the socio-economic disparities between the two
segments in [sic] the island have become much deeper" than even
those conditions that "undermined the consociational experiment
in the period 1960-63."' 1 In addition, the island's proximity and
importance to Greece and Turkey have increased the difficulty in
resolving the conflict."5
Actual bicommunality came into being in the 1570s with the
arrival of approximately 20,000 Turkish settlers on the island to
join Greeks, Maronites, and Armenians, who numbered around
85,000.116 When Great Britain accepted control of the island, the
approximate split in population was 73.4% "Greek Church" and
24.9% "Mahometan.. ' .7 Over one hundred years have passed since'
both communities rejected proportional representation because it
"would get in the way of exercising what each took to be its
legitimate prerogative to dominate the other," resulting in a "lack
of trust and mutual good will" that "persists to this day.""' 8
Historically, enosis (unity with Greece) has been sought by
Greek Cypriots and opposed by Turkish Cypriots."' While

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.
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alienation between the two communities can be traced to the
effort to achieve enosis, the educational systems of the two
communities that "were effectively transplanted from Turkey and
Greece" have also played a significant part."' The curricula of
separate schools for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots taught
the historical "enmity and warfare between the two mainlands,"
thus ensuring the same enmity between Greek and Turkish
Cypriot children. ' 1

This was a constant reminder

of their

differences and "reinforced the growing
sense of distrust and
2
1 2
antagonism between the two groups.

The fighting that took place to force the English out of
Cyprus had two differing objectives: Greek Cypriots fought for
enosis whereas the Turkish Cypriots wanted partition. 3 One of the
reasons that the experiment in consociational democracy failed is
that "there was no overarching loyalty" uniting the two
communities.' Rather than being "a single people" as Cypriots
with different dispositions, inhabitants of the island were "two
different peoples" whose "nationalism was virtually a figment of
British imagination" because they considered themselves tied to
their respective ethnic heritages.'" And, the leaders of the two
communities were not interested in moderation and compromise."
This was evident in the pre-independence conflict as well as the
post-1960 operation of the fledgling republic. 7 Although the
unique aspect of a constitution established to reflect consociational
democracy is its recognition of communal separation, the U.S.
State Department claimed this to be its "great weakness.'2 .8
The demise of consociational democracy in Cyprus was
actually attributable to the structure of the island's society. To
succeed, the political leaders of both communities would have
been required to commit to the continued unity of the republic and
demonstrate "a spirit of compromise and mediation. '12 Because
Cyprus was a "dual segment" society, politics was "a zero-sum
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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game" where the gain by one community was seen as a loss for the
other, tending to "exacerbate intercommunal antagonisms."'3
Majority segment domination of the minority segment was the
result. The dual imbalance proved fatal because Turkish Cypriots
were only about 18% of the island's population and also
disadvantaged economically.'3 ' The Greek Cypriot majority "were
reluctant partners to an agreement which, in their view, had been
forced upon them.""'32
The United States, as the primary mediator in the Cyprus
conflict, entered the picture in 1963 in order to prevent a war
between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. This intervention had
the effect of partitioning the island between the two communities,
without considering "the rights, wishes, or interests" of the
people.' 4 From 1963-1974, the Greek Cypriots sought "a unitary
government in which the rights of the minority were
constitutionally guaranteed" while Turkish Cypriots argued that
"the bicommunal constitution had established the republic on the
federated principle of two separate communities with identical
political rights."'' 5 By 1974, the de facto partition of the island and
the presence of Turkish troops in the North had the dramatic
effect of shifting the balance of power so that plans for a federal
solution to the Cyprus problem were severely altered.' This
3 7 has
positions.
of
hardening
a
demonstrate
to
except
changed
not
Greek Cypriots have been successful in internationalizing
their position, while Turkish Cypriots have not had the same
benefits because the international community (with the exception
of Turkey) only recognizes the Greek Cypriot republic.'8 The two
communities appear to be moving further apart as time passes.
Greek Cypriots want a federation where all powers not specifically
designated to the two separate governments are reserved to the
central government."' Turkish Cypriots see a loose federation

130. Id. at 227.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 227-28.
133. See Sean J. Byrne, The Roles of External Ethnoguarantorsand Primary Mediators
in Cyprus and Northern Ireland, 24 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 149, 165 (2006).
134. Id.
135. See Coughlan, supra note 107, at 228.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 231.
138. Id. at 229.
139. Id. at 232.
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where all powers are retained by the two separate states except for
those powers specifically designated to the central government. °
Each side has a different point of view regarding solution to the
impasse because both see history in dissimilar ways, while at the
same time sharing "a basic lack of trust and a deep-seated
4
insecurity about the future.1
' The fundamental conflict between

Greek and Turkish Cypriots is about the "insecurity of both
communities": Each need "to feel safe from the threat they believe
the other poses to their independence and freedom. ,112
Both sides are adamant concerning their respective
preconditions for negotiation of any settlement. 1' Turkish Cypriots
insist on the continued presence of Turkish troops for purposes of
their security and safety." Greek Cypriots fear that "Turkey might
finish what it started in 1974" and "are convinced that Turkey
intends to take over the whole island."1 45 Their fears are reinforced

by the continued presence of the 30,000 Turkish troops in the
north since 1974, resulting in Greek Cypriot demands for their
withdrawal.'
No one can rewrite the history that has resulted in the
demand of Greek Cypriots for a strong unitary state and the
interest of Turkish Cypriots in a loose confederation. 7 What are
the prospects for a bicommunal, bizonal federation being the
successful resolution of the intractable Cyprus conflict if John
Stuart Mills's three conditions to a federation of long duration
(i.e., mutual sympathy between the two populations, some degree
of mutual need, and assurance that one community will not
dominate the other) do not appear to be present in the Cyprus
conflict?' 8 Mills would probably conclude that the Cyprus problem
"is not a good candidate" for a federal solution'

9

Thus what can

be done with a conflict that has such a "long and difficult history"
and "the inability of third parties to resolve it"?'"
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It has been said that "no two-unit federation has ever
survived.'""' "The danger of an irreconcilable confrontation
between the units in a two unit federation is so great that sooner or
later it would lead to civil war, secession, or both."'' 2 This is all the
more likely where one, of the two units is dominant. 3 As
bicommunal societies, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus
face difficulties because the majority communities have succeeded
in dominating the minority, making it difficult to design a structure
of government that can successfully manage the resulting
tensions."' In the case of Cyprus, the conflict between Greece and
Turkey (as the two "mother countries") has defined the historical
struggle.'55
With the declaration of independence by the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, following nine
years of the island's partition since 1974, "de facto, if not de jure,
autonomy" has been achieved by the Turkish Cypriots. Is it
realistic to expect that they will surrender this now?5 It is not
possible to force federation on an "unwilling partner. '
"Continued international mediation designed to achieve
[federation] flies in the face of what we know about Cyprus and
what we have learned
about the conditions under which federalism
58
is likely to succeed.'
The possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation is critical to
the consideration of this destructive ethnic conflict. Without this
there can be no resolution as forgiveness means relinquishing the
drive for vengeance against those who caused harm. An integral
element is the willingness to assist in the rehabilitation of the
offender without being required to forget the harm suffered.
Seeking just punishment is not prohibited so long as the goal is the
eventual return of the offender to the community. Forgiveness is
preferred over "nursing hate" so that the parties can move forward
with their lives. The injured party accepts both the good and the
bad in themselves as well as in the harm-doer as part of the process
of forgiveness. This does not preclude the victim from establishing
6
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conditions of forgiveness that are the subject of the negotiation
between harm-doer and victim that is facilitated by an
independent impartial intervener from the community. Beyond
forgiveness we find reconciliation that re-establishes the
relationship between victim and harm-doer for the future as they
move on with their respective lives. 9
The following are among the issues that are especially
important when considering the establishment of cooperative
relations in the aftermath of a destructive conflict: ,"
* Mutual security by its very nature requires that both
sides feel secure so that each side is comfortable.
Important to this requirement are disarmament and
arms control procedures that are mutually verifiable.'
" Mutual respect necessarily implies that protection from
both physical danger and psychological harm and
humiliation requires mutual cooperation. When one
side engages in activities such as insult, humiliation, or
inconsiderate conduct, the other usually responds in
kind. The result is a decrease in both physical and
psychological security.162
* Humanization of the other is the antithesis of
demonization and requires that each side see the other
in the context of everyday activities that emphasize
their commonalities rather than their differences.'63
* Fair rules for managing conflict require the
preparation for disputes by advance development of
all elements' ' for their constructive and just
management. 6
• Curbing the extremists on both sides starts with an
understanding that when one side initiates extremist
conduct within its borders the other side will follow
suit so that it becomes necessary for both to act if the
effort is to be successful.' 65

159. See Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43,62-64 (Morton Deutsch et al. eds., 2006).
160. Id. at 64.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 65.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Gradual development of mutual trust and cooperation
will have the best chance of success if early
cooperative endeavors are successful. So the
opportunities and projects for cooperative efforts must
be: (1) clearly achievable, (2) meaningful, and (3)
significant.' 66
Conflict and justice are "bidirectional. 167 Successful
prevention of destructive conflict presupposes more than
constructive conflict resolution processes." It requires change in
the way our societal institutions (economic, educational, familial,
political, and religious) recognize and honor human equality,
69
shared community, non-violence, fallibility, and reciprocity.'
"Adherence to these values not only eliminates gross injustices,
but also reduces the likelihood that conflict itself takes a
destructive course and, as a consequence, gives rise to injustice."'7
Rather than being "an immutable fact that inevitably leads to
war,"'' ethnicity is a social construction of symbols, myths, and
memories that can be changed with the passage of time.'72 While
ethnic conflicts have been attributed by some theorists to deep and
ancient hatreds or grand clashes of civilizations, Sigmund Freud's
term "the narcissism of small differences" seems to be a better
description.'73
While every conflict is different, there is a common dynamic
consisting of (1) divisions created by ethnic symbols and myths,
and (2) fears for group survival created by economic rivalries or
the weakening of state authority. " When support is mobilized
through appeals to ethnic symbols by elites or leaders, any number
of events (such as those of 1963 and 1974 in Cyprus) can spark
fighting'. "Symbolic politics" play a role in the use of the
emotional power of ethnic symbolism and is used by political
entrepreneurs and extremist groups to reconstruct the preferences
*
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of the citizenry at large.'76 The result for many ethnic disputes is
that they erupt because conflict is preferred over cooperation by
one or both sides. 7
Destructive conflicts persisting for long periods of time are
capable of resisting attempts at resolution and "can appear to take
on a life of their own" because they attract multiple parties,
increase in complication, and threaten "basic needs and values."''
In conflicts such as the one in Cyprus where hostilities have existed
"for centuries," the results are negative in that they consist of
mutual alienation, contempt, and atrocities such as genocide,
murder, and rape.'79
The essential point to understand about "intractable
conflicts" is that they "persist because they appear impossible to
resolve.' ' " Intractable conflicts are differentiated from tractable
ones by "their persistence, destructiveness, and resistance to
resolution.'.' If an intractable conflict has persisted for some time,
many of the following characteristics will be present: (a) context
(legacies of dominance and injustice, and instability); (b) issues
(human and social polarities, and symbolism and ideology); (c)
relationships (exclusive and inescapable, oppositional group
identities, and intense internal dynamics); (d) processes (strong
emotionality, malignant social processes, and pervasiveness,
complexity, and flux); and (e) outcomes (protracted trauma and
normalization of hostility and violence)."
In addressing intractable conflict there are five major
paradigm approaches:'83
* Realism. These are protracted conflicts that are
"dangerous, high-stakes games that are won through
strategies
of
domination,
control,
and
countercontrol.""'
* Human Relations. This is the view of intractable
conflict as a "destructive relationship" that locks
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Peter T. Coleman, Intractable Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 533,533 (Morton Deutsch et al. eds., 2006).
179. See id.
180. Id. at 534.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 534-40.
183. See id. at 541.
184. Id. at 542.
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parties "in an increasingly hostile and vicious
escalatory spiral and from which there appears to be
no escape.'
* Pathology (Medical). This views intractable social
conflicts as "pathological diseases, as infections or
cancers of the body politic that can spread and afflict
the system and that therefore need to be correctly
diagnosed, treated, and contained.""
* Postmodernism. These conflicts are seen as intractable
because they are "rooted in the ways we make sense of
the world."'9 7
* Systems. This "is based on an image of a simple living
cell developing and surviving within its natural
environment."' '
There is something in each of these approaches that would be
applicable to and useful concerning the Cyprus problem:
* Realism. Strong protective action is necessary leading
to the discovery of "effective methods for minimizing
acts of aggression and for bolstering a sense of social
and institutional stability, while at the same time
confronting the underlying patterns of intergroup
dominance and oppression that are the bedrock of
many conflicts. '
" Human Relations. "[C]hange is thought to be brought
about most effectively through the planful targeting of
people, communities, and social conditions, and is best
mobilized through normative re-educative processes of
influence." 9 '
* Pathology. This model is favored by "agencies,
and
organizations,
community-based
nongovernmental organizations working in settings of
protracted conflict."'
* Postmodern. This view treats "conflict as a story, a
narrative or myth that provides a context for

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

0

[Vol. 29:463

interpretation of actions and events, both past and
present, which largely shapes our experience of
ongoing conflicts."'"
Systems. While one of the most common, it is the least
well developed of the five paradigms; yet this appears
to be the most applicable for the Cyprus problem
because it "encourages us to see the whole" presenting
"the political, the relational, the pathological, and the
epistemological as simply different elements of the
living system of the conflict.'

93

The attractive aspects

of this paradigm are the "interdependent nature of the
various objectives in intervention of mutual security,
stability, equality, justice, cooperation, humanization
of the other, reconciliation, tolerance of difference,
containment of tension and violence, compatibility and
complexity of meaning, healing, and reconstruction.' '9 4
While much work is necessary to make this paradigm
successfully operative, it does suggest "that through
the weaving and sequencing of such complementary
approaches, it may be possible to trigger shifts in the
deep structure of systems like Northern Ireland,
Cyprus, and the Middle East, in a manner that may
produce a sustained pattern of transformational
change."' 95
What, then, should be the guidelines for intervention in
Cyprus? Looking to the work of Morton Deutsch, Dean Pruitt,
Paul Olczak, Heidi Burgess, Guy Burgess, John Paul Lederach,
Herbert Kelman, and Michael Wessells, we can consider the
following:96
" conducting a thorough analysis of the conflict system
prior to intervention;' 7
* considering the complexity of intractable conflict, a
include
a
framework
must
multidisciplinary
foundation based on analysis and intervention; 8
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fostering an authentic experience of "ripeness" among
disputants or key representatives of the various groups
involved in an intractable conflict.'99
orienting the disputants toward the primary objective
of defining a fair, constructive process of conflict
engagement rather than attempting to achieve conflict
resolution outcomes."

*

using elicitive (rather than prescriptive) approaches
when working across cultures;"'
* using short-term interventions such as crisis
management that are coordinated and mindful of longterm objectives;2 2 and
* initiating and sustaining constructive, nonlinear
change.203
Appropriate approaches for issues rooted in the past, the
present, and the future must be integrated in the general
intervention strategy.2 m"Ultimately, conflict practitioners need to
199. Id. at 549-51. This is "one of the first and most critical challenges conflict resolvers
face when working with malignant conflict systems" because the disputants must be
helped "to cross their own social psychological barriers to making peace with their
enemy." Id. "When destructive and escalatory dynamics have become normalized,
ripeness should be viewed as a commitment to a change in the nature of the relations of
the parties from a destructive orientation toward a more constructive state of coexistence
with potential for mutual gain." Id.
200. Id. at 551.
201. Id. at 551-52. This tends to be both more respectful of disputants and more
empowering and sustainable. Id. A prescriptive intervenor is one who is perceived as the
expert while the participants are "passive recipients of predetermined knowledge, models,
and skills" of the intervenor. Id. at 552. The elicitive approach emphasizes "the local,
cultural expertise of the participants" so both intervenor and participants "together design
interventions that are specifically suited to the problems, resources, and constraints of the
specific cultural context." Id. An elicitive approach eliminates the bias embraced by
prescriptive intervention but additionally empowers the participants through respect for,
embracing of, and accommodating their voices.
202. Id. at 552-53.
203. Id. at 553-54. Effects of three impact types are possible: (1) episodic ("direct and
immediate but typically short term or superficial"); (2) developmental (takes time to
unfold but may greatly affect the quality of the patterns of the interaction); and (3) radical
(dramatic alteration of the system's pattern). Id. at 554. The "agent of change" level can
also result in categorical differences in the initiatives of change themselves. Id. There are
three general agent of change levels: (1) top-down ("leaders and elite decision makers");
(2) middle-out ("key midlevel leaders and community networks and structures"); and (3)
bottom-up ("grassroots organizations or the masses directly"). Id. Radical impact from the
bottom-up seems to have the best chance of succeeding to "trigger fundamental shifts in
conflict patterns (from destructive to constructive) through small but important changes"
that are "frame-breaking."Id.
204. Id. at 554-55.
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develop enhanced capacity for understanding the power of the
past, as well as the patience and tolerance that some of these
approaches demand... 5
Although many attempts are made to resolve conflict
situations, only a few are successful. ' The main indication for
possible settlement is "ripeness," which translates into that point
where both sides are "hurting" so much that the cost to continue is
too great. 7 This is the "hurting stalemate" concept.' Not all
hurting stalemate situations have led to settlement, Cyprus being a
prime example. 8
"At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cyprus
conflict remains one of the great puzzles in international conflict
resolution." '' In over 40 years, UN peacemaking efforts have
yielded only two agreements in the 1970s that aspired to a
bicommunal federation.' Yet even these efforts have been
undermined by mistrust between the two communities, creating a
de facto political division of the island. 12 As long as this mistrust
continues, no proposal - however well-crafted -will mend the
situation.213
A possible prerequisite to creating a united Cyprus is the
acknowledgement of the "political and psychological nature of the
division" that has existed for at least two generations. 14 This
requires acknowledgement of "two equal political communities as
they exist on their current territory" so that each is "sufficiently
secure" to take the necessary steps "towards a true
rapprochement.. 5 One of- the key roadblocks is in the word
"equal."

205. Id. at 555.
206. See HUGH MIALL ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION 162 (1st ed.
1999).
207. Id. This may "foster great commitment to the peace process" by the participants
ultimately leading "to plans and initiatives with prolonged sustainability." Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Susanne Baier-Allen, The Failure of Power-Sharing in Cyprus: Causes and
Consequences, in MANAGING AND SETTLING ETHNIC CONFLICTS 77, 77 (Ulrich

Schneckener & Stefan Wolff eds., 2004).
211. Id.
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Although the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus
was bicommunal in nature, it served to deepen the divisions
between the two communities. The constitution did not establish
''a common Cypriot identity," but perpetuated distrust by
maintaining a delicate balance between the respective interests of
the Greek majority and Turkish minority.216 To worsen matters, it
contained "remnants of colonial rule that could not be resolved on
independence and were thus left to be worked out by the Cypriots
themselves.. 2 .
The 1960 Constitution contained the "four characteristics that
define a system of power-sharing": (1) coalition of major ethnic
groups, (2) proportional allocation of public service appointments
and funds, (3) segmental autonomy, and (4) decision-making
subject to mutual veto; however, there was a failure of powersharing on the island."' This failure resulted from four elements:
(1) lack of fairness, (2) lack of functionality, (3) lack of political
will, and (4) lack of common identity."9 After only three years
dealing with the constitution, Makarios attempted to secure its
revision to remove obstacles interpreted by the Greek Cypriots to
be detrimental to "the smooth functioning of the government"20
The aftermath has "left Cyprus de facto partitioned.. 2 '
Greek Cypriots have sought a federal republic that would (1)
be independent, (2) maintain territorial unity, (3) recognize a
single sovereignty, and (4) provide the same citizenship for all
They have strived for a 70:30 ratio in elected
Cypriots.2
representation and a reduction of the Turkish Cypriot area to
facilitate repatriation of at least a majority of the 160,000 Greek
Cypriot refugees to their homes in the north. 3 They have also
demanded unrestricted freedom of movement, residence, and
complete
on the
they insist
Additionally,
property.
demilitarization of the island and "repatriation" of Turkish settlers
who have immigrated to the north since 1974.25

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 87.

490

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 29:463

Turkish Cypriots have sought to emphasize the bizonal,
bicommunal aspects of a new federal republic with each separate
community having equal partnership status.126 Any such new
federal republic would hold powers limited to the following
equally represented areas: foreign affairs, finance, and economic
coordination."' The two separate constituent states would retain all
other powers. 8 Only minor concessions would be made so that
Turkish Cypriots would retain at least twenty-nine percent of the
territory on the island. 9 They feel that the three freedoms
advanced by the Greek Cypriots should be restricted, especially to
the right to acquire property where compensation should be the
method of adjustment. 2" Neither the presence of mainlanders from
Turkey or Turkish troops is an issue for negotiation."' Both
communities are seen as equal so sovereignty should be treated in
like manner.232
Greek Cypriots have officially supported a federal solution
2 Domestically, however,
when facing international observation. 33
their political leaders have rejected the proposal as an
acknowledgment of "defeat" in the 1974 war.3 Turkish Cypriots
have promoted a two-state confederation in an effort to preserve
their 1974 gains. 235 Turkey has been the only outside supporter of
this two-state proposal.23 The international community has pushed
not for a confederation, but a bizonal, bicommunal federation.23"
As the world's ethnic conflicts have become more visible,
academic circles have begun to embrace the ideas of secession and
partition.238 Consequently, the future of a possible federal solution
in Cyprus has been seriously questioned.2 " Both sides seem to
prefer the status quo to accepting the suggestions of the other.2 '
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Although continuation of the status quo over the long run "is too
unstable and explosive," the international community is faced with
a troubling dilemma.24' Partition violates international law if it is
not by mutual agreement, and a federal solution cannot be
imposed because public support would doom it from the
beginning. 2 While there have been threats that UN peacekeepers
would be withdrawn in the event of indefinite continuation of the
status quo, this "would leave a dangerous vacuum, and fighting
would probably break out immediately. 2 3 And diplomatic
withdrawal would succeed in simply leaving the Cypriots on their
own without the resolve to work toward a negotiated solution.2"
Susanne Baier-Allen has suggested that moving beyond the
status quo will require certain elements of the current division to
be accepted, namely the existence of "two ethnically homogenous
communities, each with their own political administration."2 5'
Acknowledgement of the current state of affairs in Cyprus is also
necessary as a precondition to establishing the trust required to
continue the negotiation process. 4 ' Additionally, she believes
political and economic confidence-building measures are needed. 7
Her approach to restarting the negotiation process is based on
"the point that a solution will not be brought about by engineering
a constitutional plan at the negotiating table." '
In the long term, a solution must start
from an understanding of the psychological state of
the people concerned - both officials and ordinary
citizens - that works to alter hostile perceptions and
to foster positive images of the other side.
Ultimately, any solution will have to be put to the
test by the people that have to live with it.
Therefore, any solution has to start with them.2 9
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Interestingly, Baier-Allen predicts that a failure by the EU to
use the "carrot and stick" approach to get the parties to
compromise would be fatal.250 "If the EU simply accepted a divided
Cyprus, then the Green Line would become one of its external
borders, cementing the division of the island., 25 On May 1, 2004,
the EU accepted a divided Cyprus.2
IV. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEBUILDING IN CYPRUS

Peace has been "spoiled" in Cyprus since the inter-communal
fighting of 1963 and the following partition of the island in 1974.25
To further exacerbate the problem, each community has taken
actions that have strengthened their respective positions at the
expense of the other community's basic needs. 4 The failure of the
UN to succeed in mediating the conflict is attributable to the
spoiling activities of different actors advocating the specific
bargaining positions of the two communities. Spoiling is not a
clear-cut action, but rather differs from "normal politics" by a
matter of degree. 6 In Cyprus, this phenomenon has not been
inimical to negotiation processes but rather to the peace process
and settlement of the conflict. 7
Spoiling has been accomplished by those who have believed
that a particular vision of a future Cyprus was attainable. 8 While
spoiling contains its own ideology and perceptions of power,
"vested interests in the persisting conflict have also played a
role. 2 9 The relatively low turnover of political elites in each
community has accentuated this problem by reducing "the scope
for constructive change. ''21 It has also "hinder[ed] a genuine

Id. at 90.
Id. at 90-91.
See Turk, supra note 1, at 250.
Nathalie Tocci, Spoiling Peace in Cyprus, in CHALLENGES TO PEACEBUILDING:
MANAGING SPOILERS DURING CONFLICr RESOLUTION 262, 262 (Edward Newman &
Oliver Richmond eds., 2006).
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transformation of elite interests, ideologies, and discourse in line
'
with changing circumstances." 26

The basic needs of the principal parties and the "spoiling"
positions and actions they have advanced to satisfy such needs are
numerous. Greek Cypriots want:
* reunification of Cyprus and avoidance of secession by
the northern part of the island or its annexation to
26
Turkey;
* a return to the status quo prior to the 1974 arrival of
Turkish mainland troops and the larger territorial
share and political representation;16
* liberalization of the "three freedoms" (movement,
settlement, and property) as well as respect for human
right, including the right of refugees to return to their
properties in the north;"
5
* security guarantees against Turkish aggression;
* abrogation of the Treaty of Guaranty of 1959,
replacing those unilateral rights of intervention in
Cyprus by Britain, Greece, and Turkey with an
international guarantees that would prevent Turkey
from interfering in the affairs of the island;" and
* complete repatriation of Turkish immigrants who
came to Cyprus after 1974.67

On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots want:
* political equality with Greek Cypriots; "
* continued Turkish security guarantees;2 9 in addition to
" rigid limitations on the number of Greek Cypriots
allowed to return to the north and the time frame for
that to occur, as well as insisting that reciprocal
property claims be resolved mostly through
compensation
and
inter-communal
property
exchanges.Y
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
See id. at 266.
Id.
See id. at 268.
Id.
.Id.
Id.
Id. at 270.
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The reason that the foregoing assertions are considered as
"spoiling" rather than "normal and legitimate political positions"
is because "they deny the mutual fulfillment of the principal
parties' basic needs. 27. Over the years, both parties have
attempted to legitimize their spoiling positions in various ways.272
Since 1974, the Greek Cypriots have been persuaded by the
government, civil society, and the media of the moral and legal
superiority of their cause. 73 Certain factions have also
characterized any attempt by the Greek government to pressure
Greek Cypriots to a settlement as a betrayal of the Greek Cypriots74
and an abdication of Greece's "historical responsibilities.1
Turkish Cypriots have played upon fears of renewed domination
by Greek Cypriots to support independent statehood.2 5 As a
result, Turkish Cypriots see the return of Greek Cypriot refugees,
the liberalization of the "three freedoms," or inter-communal
contact as a return to the unacceptable status quo ante 1963.6
Concerns about displacement through property readjustments and
the repatriation of Turkish settlers have also served as justification
for their spoiling positions.2" To further complicate matters,
Turkey has insisted that Cyprus is the key to Turkish national
security and necessary to protect it from "hostile Greek designs."278
Spoiling has been enabled by international third parties. 79
Greek Cypriots have enlisted the aid of the UN, EU, and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), while Turkish
Cypriots have "mirrored" the actions of Greek Cypriots. " With
increased success for the Greek Cypriots coming from the
international community, the Turkish Cypriots stepped up their
insistence on political equality conditioned by recognition of their
sovereignty. 8 ' Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists even
argued that unilateral admission of Greek Cypriots to the EU

271. Id.
272. See generally id. at 272-80.
273. Id. at 272. Notably, the desirability of true compromise with the Turkish Cypriots
has never been advanced by the political class. Id. at 273.
274. See id. at 273.
275.

Id.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See id.
See id. at 274.
Id.
See id. at 275.
See id. at 275-76.
See id.
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without Turkish Cypriots and the prior admission of Turkey would
lead to permanent partition of the island.282
The EU's potential for generating support for reunification
was a missed opportunity through the failure to foster a new effort
to build consensus among all elements on the island, resulting in
increased spoiling arguments and tactics. 23 The current situation is
ripe for further spoiling because EU membership for Greek
Cypriots places them in an improved bargaining position to
prevent further EU actions that could assist the Turkish Cypriots
by lifting the restrictions causing their international isolation.
Also, the unintentional actions of the EU in allowing the
possibility of full membership for a divided Cyprus has encouraged
the efforts of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists in arguing
that this could consolidate partition." The ultimate reversal
occurred when the people in the north forced moderation through
a positive referendum vote - but that went for naught because the
Greek Cypriot spoilers carried the day.26 Finally, the EU's inability
to create an effective policy regarding Turkey missed the
opportunity to cause a change in Turkey's policy towards Cyprus
prior to the Turkish elections in November 2002.7 The principal

lesson here is that the EU's failed policies in Cyprus are its "failure
to account for the diverse make-up of the parties in the conflict"
through lack of "a common and consistent EU foreign policy
towards the conflict" itself that "never materialized. ' 2 1
In order "to keep the internal parties together to take a
pragmatic approach to mediate a resolution as there was in South
Africa," there must be "a mutually hurting stalemate." 9 However,
the hurting stalemate in Cyprus is not mutual because the Greek
Cypriots appear to be able to do quite well without the Turkish
Cypriots, especially after Greek Cypriot admission to the EU. The
reverse appears not to be true for the Turkish Cypriots. For
successful peacebuilding in Cyprus there must be "an intersection
of the objectives, the actors, and a complementarity of the

282. Id. at 277.
283. See id. at 278.
284. Id. at 279.
285. See id.

286.
287.
288.
289.

See id. at 279, 280.
Id.
Id.
See Byrne, supra note 133, at 155.
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mediators' [primary and external ethnoguarantors] roles and their
functions."2"
V. HOW TO WORK WITH THIS INTRAcTABLE CONFLICT

In working with a system of intractable conflict we need to
understand the interrelationship of the inter-communal elements
and their interaction with outside influences as they change with
the passage of time.2 9' This will require a consideration of the
positive and negative feedback that may result in escalation, deescalation, and stabilization of conflict. The complex activities
utilized would be in the nature of integrating "multidisciplinary
perspectives and methodologies" that will deal with "immediate,
short-term, and long-term goals in a comprehensive and
coordinated fashion," while considering the distinctions between
the past, present, and future intervention approaches."
"Ripeness" is also a critical element in the process.
Emphasizing the introduction of forces of change rather than
removal of obstacles of resistance, hence determining the present
commitment of the conflicting parties to participate in "a
constructive conflict process" is crucial. 93 Following closely is the
requirement of awareness of post-traumatic stress syndrome
symptoms and manifestations of trauma at the community level, as
well as knowledge of crisis intervention in cases of emergency.294
Constructive conflict processes require the use of
of
forms
resolution
dispute
alternative
collaborative
independent/neutral third-party intervention plus facilitation of
dialogue sessions, town hall meetings, problem-solving and other
confidence-building workshops. Elicitation of locally relevant
cross-cultural information is also important.295
Because of the need to intervene at an early point when the
parties to a conflict are able to "still see the humanity and the
validity of the other's needs," it seems that the "greatest hope in
290. Id. at 163. The third-party interveners in the conflicts existing in Cyprus and
Northern Ireland are of two types: Primary mediators are those "who have the power and
clout to enforce agreements," and regional external ethnoguarantors are those "who have
cultural, historical, and political ties to internal allies." See id. at 149.
291. See Coleman, supra note 178, at 556 (referring to dynamical system theory as
applied to the Cyprus problem).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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working intractable conflicts is to find the means to avert them. 2 96
In the case of the long-standing Cyprus problem it is far too late to
avert the conflict. The question is whether it is too late to
intervene successfully with a new creative approach.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is perilous to ignore intractable conflict.297 The role of
emotions indicates that simply working to "separate the people
from the problem and focus on interests instead of positions to
surface options for mutual gain that ...

will be embraced by all"

has limited applicable success to intractable conflict (although
both sides of the Cyprus problem have many commonalities).298
The Cyprus conflict is intractable because it has proved an
unworthy candidate for mediation. While not hopeless, it is
arguable that success can only be accomplished through
transforming it into a more peaceful and cooperative situation
than has been the case to date. This transformation will ensure
that the parties will live side-by-side peacefully while they continue
to disagree. At some point, perhaps they will once again approach
the bargaining table to reconsider reunification. Until that time,
transformation of the relationship between the two communities
will help to establish stability in the region.
For such a transformation to take place, outside third parties
who have mismanaged the problem will need to withdraw. The
only sure way to avoid mismanagement by third parties would be
for the people themselves on both sides of the dispute, and at the
grassroots level, to take control of their own destiny. This can be
accomplished through transforming "the culture of the conflict
into a culture of peace" that empowers the citizenry on both sides
"in a constructive conflict-resolution process" through use of
"storytelling and dialogue groups," enabling the parties to "mourn,
heal, reconcile, and forge a new constructive story."29 Failing this,

296. Id. at 557.
297. Heidi Burgess, Guy Burgess & Sandra Kaufman, The Challenge of Intractable
Conflicts: Introduction to the Colloquium, 24 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 173,174 (2006).
298. See id. at 175.
299. See Byrne, supra note 133, at 167. Storytelling is used to surface "underlying
complexities in virulent protracted conflict situations" and can be used "as an intervention
to build bridges between communities." Id.
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"future seeds of destruction may be sown for the next generation
to deal with."3 "
In December 2005, Turkish Cypriots constructed a bridge in
the divided capital city of Nicosia to ease movement for Turkish
troops stationed in the north. This upset Greek Cypriots and
frustrated plans for constructing a new crossing point at the Ledra
Street boundary in the middle of the divided capital."' In January
2007, Turkish Cypriots extended a reconciliation gesture by
starting to dismantle the bridge."m On March 9, 2007, Greek
Cypriots, in a reciprocal good faith33 gesture, demolished a dividing
wall on the Ledra boundary street.
Complicating the situation is a recent statement by a Turkish
academic that UN Peacekeeping Forces are no longer needed in
Cyprus because the division of the island "into two distinct states"
has eliminated "any cause for conflict between the two
communities."" The expert added: "The intricate and chronic
Cyprus issue has caused a waste of time and resources. '
Moreover, an important Greek Cypriot columnist has commented:
"In short, after 44 years, during which there were countless rounds
of negotiations and all aspects of a settlement agreed, apart from a
few points that were completed by the UN at Birgenstock, we
now want everything deleted and to start from scratch. At best, at
this rate, we might hope for a Cyprus settlement in 50 years from
today."" He suggested that the two leaders of their respective

300. Id.
301. Id.; see also A Timeline of Key Events in Cyprus' History, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Mar.
9,
2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/09/europe/EU-GEN-CyprusTimeline.php.
302. Id.
303. Id.; but see Cyprus' Greek Side Razes Partof Barrier,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at

A9, availableat LEXIS (reporting that the Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos
had said that there would be no civilian crossing where that checkpoint had been until
Turkey removed its troops from the location).
304. See Ali Asian Kilic, Experts Suggest Removal of UN Peacekeeping Force in

Cyprus, TODAY'S ZAMAN, Mar.
10,
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=105048.
305.

2007,

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-

Id.

306. See Loucas Charalambous, Return to Point Zero, CYPRUS MAIL,
http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=31087&cat id=1 (last visited Mar. 6,
2007). Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived on Saturday March 27, 2004, in
BUrgenstock, Switzerland, where talks involving the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
parties, with the participation of Greece and Turkey, were underway. Secretary-General's
Visit to Burgenstock, Switzerland (March 28-31, 2004), http://www.un.org/av/
photo/sgtrips/sgswitz032804.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2007). On Monday, March 29, 2004,
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communities might better serve the peace process if they spent the
afternoon together in the northern village of Kyrenia.3 °' In doing
so, "they would finally realise that they solved the Cyprus
problem, for good, in 2004 and did not have to exert themselves
[any further] ...

in order to achieve their objective. The objective

3 ' Presumably he was referring to the
has already been achieved.""
de facto partition informally recognized by the results of the April
2004 referenda vote.
A prominent Turkish columnist has also indicated that the
"single state model" will no longer work," and "behind closed
doors" there is a possibility for a "negotiated partition of the
island" because of the failure to provide equal status for both
communities.... "Despite insistence on putting efforts on plans for
the unity of the island, in the coming years we may be hearing
increased voices in public for a negotiated partition process as any
attempt to unite the island is becoming outdated. We can't change
the natural flow of the river, can we?" 1'
Is it too late to intervene successfully in the Cyprus conflict
with a new creative approach? The answer would seem to be "yes"
unless we alter the game by applying a radical change initiative
from the bottom-up level through organization of inter-communal
grassroots dialogue workshop groups that will: (1) strive to "see
' and (2) follow
the humanity and the validity of the other's needs" 12
up the workshops with education and mobilization of their
respective communities as Cypriots to make known their desire for
reunification at the polls. Among other issues, these workshops
would consider mutual security, mutual respect, humanization of
the other, fair rules for managing conflict, curbing the extremists
on both sides, and gradual development of mutual trust and
cooperation.
The different priorities of the two communities may make it
possible for each to achieve their goals without harming the
M

the Secretary-General unveiled a revised Cyprus plan that he said would "break the ice"
in stalled reunification talks. Id.
307. See Charalmbous, supra note 306.
308. Id.
309. See Lale Sariibrahimoglu, Negotiated Partition: An Ideal Solution for Cyprus,

TODAY'S ZAMAN, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?
haberno=104603.
310. See id.
311. Id.

312. See Coleman, supra note 178, at 557.
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other."' Being able to work well with conflict will strengthen how
they relate to each other and provide opportunities to deal with
their differences, thereby turning "adversaries into partners. 3 '.
"While an immediate goal may be to improve the way our side
deals with their side, a focus on process tends to leave us both on
the same side."3 '5 This requires being "open to asking different
questions." 6 Conflicting interests can be handled more
successfully in this manner. '
The issue is "not about who is right and who is wrong, or
about one-shot solutions, but about the process for dealing with
conflicting views about right and wrong, and for dealing with the
inevitable changes that lie ahead. 3 18 One side asking itself what it
would like the other side to do, why the other side has failed to
follow through, and how it could aid the other side in following
through is a good starting place. 9 Nevertheless, each side needs to
change the questions that it has been asking of the other.'
Some of this has been occurring through workshops funded
from the outside such as the 2005 advanced narrative mediation
workshop in Nicosia and the 2006 bicommunal academics
workshop in San Diego, California (conducted by John Winslade
and Gerald Monk, and the author), with financial support from the
Fred J. Hansen Institute for World Peace at San Diego State
University. In addition, the 2006-2007 Rock Rose Institute Youth
Dialogue Project (YDP) engaged youths aged eighteen to twentyfour from five countries including Cyprus "based on their role as
change makers in their communities and their ongoing
commitment to non-violence." 2 ' Also, human rights efforts should
313. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI 143 (Harvard Univ. Press
1994) (1922).
314. Id.

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.

320.

Id.

321. This information was provided by Dr. Dilek Latif who is an instructor in the
International Relations Department at Near East University in North Nicosia (Turkish
Cypriot), Cyprus, and a visiting Fulbright Scholar in the Negotiation, Conflict Resolution
and Peacebuilding Programs at California State University, Dominguez Hills, for the
spring 2007 semester. In an e-mail to the author, dated March 19, 2007, Dr. Latif noted:
The RockRose Institute Youth Dialogue Project (YDP) is engaged youth (ages
18-24) from five countries Cyprus, New Zealand, South Africa, Denmark and
United States. Six youth were selected to represent each of these countries ( in
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be made in both communities to establish "truth and
reconciliation" type groups. But the grassroots on both sides must
become vocal in their bottom-up support, as well as participation
and advocacy, because "any solution will have to be put to the test
that have to live with it... any solution has to start
by the people
3 22
them.
with

Failing this, it would seem that the future holds little promise
for reunification. As it becomes evident from a world view that the
independence of Kosovo may be possible, the Greek Cypriot
administration "is becoming increasingly concerned" about the
possibility of such a precedent assisting the Turkish Cypriots in a
like manner.323 In the event of a similar occurrence, a de jure
partition of Cyprus may be the likely solution.

case of Cyprus 3 Turkish Cypriots and 3 Greek Cypriots), based on their role as
change-makers in their communities and their on-going commitment to nonviolence. The students have been learning and practicing skills of inquiry,
dialogue and conflict resolution. Since November 2006, participants attended in
a series of four in-country meetings to learn and practice dialogue using the
different methodologies: The World Cafd, Public Conversations Project, Search
for Common Ground, and Facing History and Ourselves. The Project will end in
May 2007.
During the Search for Common Ground meeting that took place on 5" of
January 2007 at the Near East University Library in north Nicosia the Cypriot
youth focused on finding a common ground for Cyprus. The team discussed:
"What can be our common ground? Can Cypriotness be our common ground?
Are we Turks, Greeks, Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots? It is very
complicated to identify ourselves. We know that we are different than the
mainland Turks and mainland Greeks. How do we define ourselves: Turkish
Speaking or Greek Speaking Cypriots? At the end, the session ended with the
outcome that Cypriotness is our common ground and we can use this to re-unite
our island and identify ourselves as Turkish Speaking and Greek Speaking
Cypriots in Cyprus.
Dr. Dilek Latif is one of the Turkish Cypriots facilitators of the Cyprus team
along side Mehves Beyidoglu Onen, [and] Dr. Stavroula Philippou and Dr.
Miranda Christou [are the Greek Cypriot facilitators].
please
visit
project
about
the
more
information
For
http://www.rockroseinstitute.org.
Email from Dr. Dilek Latif, Instructor, Near East U., N. Nicosia (Turkish Cypriot), to
author (Mar. 19, 2007, 00:00:00 PST) (on file with author).
322. Baier-Allen, supra note 210, at 91 (emphasis added).
323. Selcuk GUlta Ii, Greek Cypriots Fear Kosovo May Set Precedent for Northern
Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/tzCyprus, TODAY'S ZAMAN,
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=105722.

